international global market. The defeat of Fast Track was thus a step backward for the emerging New Economy and a lesson in political mobilization, partisan cooperation, and the impottance of a well-framed and publicly supported issue. Without the full participation of the world's largest trading partner, the New Economy cannot reach its full potential. In this new climate, understanding how and why Fast Track failed is crucial to ensuring successful trade policy formulation in the future.
The failure of Fast Track demonstrates how domestic political concerns and the constitutionally established system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches can impede policy goals. A simple procedural device established nearly 25 years ago, Fast Track would allow the president to negotiate trade deals with foreign governments and then submit the resulting agreement to Congress; additionally, Fast Track rules require debate to occur in Congress within a specified time before allowing a straight up-or-down vote on the completed trade agreement. There is no oppOltunity for amendments, which contributes to the speed of the process. President Clinton's economic policy is based squarely on the "New Democrat"2 strategy of eliminating foreign barriers to U.S. exports, and Fast Track authority to enter into such negotiations was one of his most important legislative priorities for the first session of ti1e 105th Congress.
The failure to pass Fast Track in 1997 reveals that without public support, future trade accords will be exposed to demagoguelY by free trade opponents. The executive and legislative branches must work closely with other free trade advocates to explain the connection between international trade, job growth, and the New Economy. Concerns over environmental interests, job losses, and human rights issues must also be addressed. State and community leaders, foundation heads, academics, and citizens must join in this national debate. The American people need to gain familiarity with the benefits that can be derived from lowering and even eliminating trade barriers, including better jobs, less expensive goods, and an improved economy. Short-sighted protectionism and legislative micro-management ignore the long-term benefits of the New Economy. If we fail to learn these lessons, future attempts to secure passage of Fast Track or free trade agreements will be met with equally fierce and successful opposition.
Shared Authority -and Tension -in Foreign Mfairs
To better understand the complexity of the Fast Track debate, one must initially examine the fundamental problems that arise when two branches of government share responsibility for an issue. As is the case with trade,3 neither the president nor Congress can operate effectively or successfully without the support of the other. The Constitution grants the president supremacy in foreign affairs 4 but provides Congress the abili-ty to raise and levy tariff" and control commerce. 5 Accordingly, negotiating trade deals with foreign governments that may affect tariffs or other domestic laws requires a cooperative relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The shared authority -and tension -exist by constitutional design. The key lies in channeling that tension into comprehensive policies that serve the u.s. in the global economy.
For many years, Congress directly authorized "the Executive to bargain over trade reciprocity with no necessity of subsequent legislative action."6 According to Congress, any presidential authority to enter into trade negotiations when tariffs or domestic laws may be changed occurs only at the expressed direction of that body. The president is able to negotiate trade deals withou t congressional consent but, without Congress' authority, there is no guarantee the House and Senate will pass the agreements unchanged. This constitutional gridlock between the two branches has yielded valying degrees of temporalY supremacy for both the executive and Congress, reSUlting in the Fast Track mechanism. 7 The Trade Act of 1974
In the early 1970s, members of Congress, seeking increased input in trade policy matters, enacted the Trade Act of 1974,8 which established the Fast Track mechanism as a tool for meeting the constitutional requirements for trade policy development. Fast Track, which was the first formalized method for trade policy formulation, was consistently reauthorized from 1974 until 1994 under both Democratic and Republican administrations.
Since its inception during the 93rd Congress, "this expedited legislativeapproval mechanism has exhibited enormous versatility as a procedural device to secure congressional-executive cooperation in the management of United States international trade policy."9 This act provided the president the credibility necessalY to negotiate agreements while ensuring ongoing executive accountability to congressional concerns.
The 1974 act provided that trade agreements "could enter into effect with respect to the United States, and that required changes would be made in domestic law, only if both Houses of Congress, by a majority vote of those present and voting, approved implementing legislation. In order to assure that a vote would be taken on such trade agreements, however ... procedural rules involving time limits, discharge petitions, limitation on debates, and a prohibition on amendments"10 were also added to ensure congressional participation as well as presidential credibility in trade negotiations.
Fast Track "allowed Congress to overcome both the political inertia and the procedural obstacles that frequently prevent a controversial measure from coming to a vote at all."11 Additionally, fU1ther executive "checks" were established by requiring the president to notify the House Ways and Congressional opponents took issue with the non-amendability of trade agreements negotiated under Fast Track. Supporters and the president countered that without this provision trading partners of the United States would simply not go through the exercise of negotiating a trade deal if Congress were allowed to make changes following its conclusion. According to one editorial supporting Fast Track, the "reality is that if Congress is allowed to change the contents of agreements, negotiations would never end. It is simply impractical for 535 people in Congress to thrash out the details of trade agreements. To be timely and effective, that authodty must be delegated, just as union members delegate to their leaders the authority to work out labor contracts with business leaders."27
The battle over 
Opponents and Advocates

Strong Opposition: Labor and Environmental Groups
The traditional Den10cratic labor and environmental constituencies began working privately to oppose Fast Track in early 1997, meeting with members to express, in the strongest terms, their intention to oppose the traditional trade negotiating authority and to hold members accountable for their votes. In the words of one labor lobbyist, the vote on Fast Track would be the "top priority ... the one [by] which the unions will judge members"28 in the elections of November 1998. This was a powerful argument to many Demo-crats who . had not forgotten the loss of 40 years of congressional control to the GOP when labor stayed home on Election Day in 1994 following the NAFTA vote in the 103rd Congress.
Representatives of organized labor and environmental issues opposed Fast Track because the trade agreements negotiated under this device would inevitably bring job loss as corporations and lower-skilled manufacturing jobs moved to lowerwage nations. Labor supporters claimed that well-paying American jobs were moving overseas as corporations took advantage of weak or nonexistent labor, environmental, and consumer safeguards in foreign countries. This loss, critics argued, destroyed good u.s. jobs by depressing domestic wages and undermining laws designed to protect the health and safety of America's working families.
Other arguments made by Fast Track opponents were less substantive. While they pointed out that workers' rights and environmental protections were minimal abroad, critics simultaneously downplayed the fact that increased American investment plays an important role in improving foreign economies and thus the well-being of foreign workers. Labor unions consistently linked Fast Track to NAFTA by arguing that the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), which was concluded as a side agreement to NAFTA in 1993,29 had done little to improve the standard of living for workers and was inadequate primarily because the agreement lacked sufficient provisions for enforceability,3o Here again, critics ignored the reality that Fast Track simply authorizes the president to enter into trade negotiations without determining the eventualoutcome.
Environmental issues, both in the United States and abroad, profoundly influence congressional votes and act as an impetus for mobilizing organizations. Environmental groups were nearly unified in their opposition to a Fast Track extension in 1997. Like the labor-related agreements in NAI-l'fA, the supplemental agreements on environmental protection in that pact were viewed as falling short of expectations. 31 The administration countered that "institutions created under the environmental agreements (in NAFTA) provide opportunities for both governments and citizens of the three NAFTA parties to interact at all levels, ensuring that the public's con-cems regarding environmental matlers \vill be heard and facilitating joint efforts to address common environmental pn)blems."j2
Strong Support: Economic alul
Foreign Policy Concerlls
Supporters of Fast Track provided l'lltlllll.:lling evidence that the nation's current economic recovery is directly dependent on increased foreign lrade.~·~ Today's "combination of low unemployment, steady growth, and low inflation in the United States would be inconceivable \vithout openness to the global economy. Proponents further argued that higher-wage, higher-skilled jobs in America resulted from increased tradl~ and that such benefits could only be realized if more trade barriers were eliminated. Supporters substantiated this argument with an example from the 19'50s when many low-wage industries moved from the Northeast to southern states, which certainly "cost some New Englanders their jobs. A generation later, Nl~W England is not simply richer. It is ridH::~r in relation to the national average than it was 40 years ago, when the flight of the mills was beginning. Meanwhile southern prosperity has grown even faster. The disparities between the country's richest states and its p( )orest are significantly narrower than they were in the 19,)Os. ",~~
The United States may lose certain low-wage, low-skilled jobs when industries move their production fadlities to developing countries as trade barriers are eliminated. While this loss may bring some temporary isolated hardship, the overwhelming global interest is positively affected in the long-term. Just like New England and the South, both America and the developing world will benefit from free trade. As a nation's workers begin to shift their demands from simply having a job to worker rights and the quality of their environment, the citizens of developing countries inevitably benefit. 56 SUppOlters raised the foreign policy and national security implications of the failure of Fast Track. Free trade supporters claimed that the U.S., as the sole remaining superpower, had a fundamental interest in enhancing peace and prosperity hy linking (~CC>t1 () Advocates on Capitol Hill from both parties repeatedly urged businesses to lobby members more aggreSSively on the issue, even with the condition that the definitive support of the business community would hinge on the contents of the final bill. Despite these urgings, many members complained that "business leaders failed to drum up support for trade agl'eements,"38 and therefore "no one in Congress felt any particular pressure or demand to support"39 the measure.
Business leaders further failed to explain the importance of free trade and Fast Track to their employees, leading legislators to criticize CEOs who had neglected to educate their employees on the importance of free trade. By withholding Sll pport for Fast Track until October 1997, the business community provided labor groups and other opponents an additional six months to get commitments from members to oppose the measure. Many Democrats who othelwise might have opted to support Fast Track were locked in early as opponents. As a result of the "timid" and "incompetent"40 business leadership, many of the 45 members of the moderate, pro-trade "New Democrat Coalition" announced themselves as opponents even before the White House had presented its Fast Track re-authorization bill to Congress.
Intergovernmental Relations
Armed with the knowledge that the debate on Fast Track would be highly contentious and acknowledging the reality of Republican control of Congress, President Clinton and his administration set out to design a proposal that could be supported by a majority of Republicans and some Democrats. Following months of consultation with the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, as well as free trade supporters from both parties, President Clinton, after nluch delay, unveiled his proposal for Fast Track on September 16, 1997. While the proposal was similar to past Fast Track measures;1I the president attempted to mollify opponents by expanding the ability to promote environmentally sustainable devel< Ipmenl and worker rights aIm lad. I.! As is common in such a controversial atmosphere where comprornise is sought. the proposal was derided hy hoth the left and right on those two issues.
Chairman Bill Archer (R-TX) of the HOllse Ways and Means Committee continued working with the administration, Republicans, and outside gn mps to pass Fast Track legislation through his committee and on to the noor of the House.!13 After working over the tlrst weekend of October and through the night of October 6, 1997, the Ways and Means Committee and the administration developed compromise language on the controversial labor and environmental provisions and introduced flR. 2621, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Authorities Act of 1997.H Two days later, the Committee considered the bill and sent it to the full House by a vote of 24-14.1') 'nle t~tct that only four of the Committee's 20
Democrats supported H.R. 2621 was perhaps the most telling sign that trouble lay ahead for the administration. Represent.Uive Charles Rangel (I)-NY), the ranking member of the Committee, refused to support the bill, stating that although the measure "may give the president the tools he needs to provide economic leadership around the world, it unfortunately does not give the president the tools he needs to provide economic leadership at home.·'u. Domestic politics had tran..,cendecl the economic rationale for liberalized trade and the need for Fast Track.
Lobbyitlg Among Democrats
The fact that the ranking Demo-('fat on the Committee responsible for trade opposed the hill presaged the difficulty the preSident would have in garnering the SUPP()rt of memhers ()f his own pal1y. A group of r)emocratil' opponents of Fast Track estahlished an effective operation to keep Democratic: Sllppolt for the initiative to fewer than fifty votes. The group "met regularly in a huddle to strategize against the president. "(7 According to Rep. Gephar<.lt, this debate was about "whether we connect our values of environmental quality, worker and human rightli to our economic policy.""H Still, a core group of approximately 15 Democratic SUppolters met lieveral times a week throughout September, October, and November to strategize and work with the administration to pass Fast Track. While some l11el11berli had less than substantive reasons for their indeciliion, most uncommitted members had genUine conflicts and concerns about the bill and felt that the lldministration, business groups, and other supporters had hliled to adequately shmv why Fast Track deserved their vote. A great effort was made to accommodate individual memhers' concerns.
LobbY#lg Among Republicatls
Historically, a majority of Republican memherli of Congress supported measures to reduct~ trade harrit'r;;, Yet despite traditionally prom()tin~ . . : ness interests, sufficient SUppOlt from the party was not assured. A strong protectionist wing of the Republican party exists, as well as a smaller prolabor group, providing Fast Track opponents the potential margin necessaty to assure defeat. Furthermore, the administration found itself "running head-on into Republicans who don't trust the president. "49 Speaker Gingrich, a committed supporter, asked Republican Whip DeLay (TX) to handle the operations on that side of the aisle and many described "the lobbying by their leadership as the most intense they had seen."50 The GOP leadership worked within the party, with outside interest groups, and with the White House to ensure the requisite number of votes to secure passage. 51 America Leads On Trade, a coalition of pro-trade business interests, as well as the u.s.
Chamber of Commerce and other groups worked in tandem with both Democratic and Republican support~ ers to find the votes for passage. Unfortunately, these often effective lobbying operations began too late in the process and many organizations that were expected to back Fast Track did not publicly support the measure until days before the vote was scheduled to occur -too late to produce the groundswell of support necessaty to ensure passage and provide political cover for uncommitted members.
Cautious and Limited Presidential Leadership
The timing of the initiative to reauthorize Fast Track also created a difficult situation for the White House. Many pro-trade Democrats had already angered labor by supporting the Most Favored Nation S2 status for China in June and felt they could not again vote against the interests of this important constituency. Furthermore, as the final appropriations bills to fund the government were being resolved, some Republicans threatened to oppose Fast Track unless the White House acquiesced to some of their priorities, such as international family planning, census sampling, and national education testing. These Republicans were "in no hur1y ... to knock themselves out to give Clinton yet another legislative VictolY, even if they generally support the objective. "53 The presidency carries a substantial amount of leverage to promote the executive's agenda and the president can potentially provide a considerable amount of leadership. 54 However, many have argued that Clinton was ineffective in using his leadership on the re-authorization of Fast Track. Although the president presented his legislation to Congress on September 16, 1997, the presentation came nearly a week after the Fast Track "roll-out" ceremony at the White House. The president was unable to secure the support of the necessaty advocates before sending the bill to Congress, causing concern that the administration's proposal would be "dead on arrival." Members of Congress complained consistently throughout the fall of 1997 that the White House "had not been effective in answering the objections of House Democrats and convincing them of the benefits of free trade. "55 The American people and Congress remained unconvinced that this trade negotiating authority was necessaty or warranted.
The art of politics allows changes to be made in legislation to allay the concerns of individual members and resolve their problems, and such "horse-trades" are made frequently. 56 The daily "wheeling, dealing, wheedling and arm-twisting" between the executive and legislative branches of government is critical when controversial measures are priority items for the nation's leaders and can often provide the votes necessary for passage. 57 Such wheeling and dealing was very much in evidence during the Fast Track debate. Although the executive branch is legally forbidden from directly lobbying members of Congress,58 the president "made numerous deals to win votes. "59 The president and the vice president both pledged to back Democratic members who anticipated a loss of needed financial support from labor as a result of their support for Fast Track.
Fast Track Fails
During the final week before the vote, lobbyists from outside organizations streamed to the Hill to meet with members and their staffs. Representatives 'on both sides of the issue frantically tried to convince those who remained undecided to vote with them. Well-attended press conferences announcing new support or opposition were held. President Clinton invited undecided members to the White House for lengthy discussions about their concerns in order to gain the necessary support. During whip meetings, members spoke openly about what it would take to bring members to support the president, and results were often produced. But the opposition to Fast Track was stronger than its support. Confronted "with the failure of a frenetic, down-to-the-wire lobbying campaign, President Clinton... called House Speaker Newt Gingrich at 1:15 a.m. [on Monday, November 10,1997] and asked him to remove the bill from a vote that had been scheduled for later that morning. "60 Despite all the deals the administration could make, the pressure put on Republican members by their leadership, and the admittedly late lobbying efforts by the business community, a vote on Fast Track by the full House did not occur. In the end, President Clinton decided to pull the bill rather than suffer a humiliating defeat that could have hindered future attempts to pass trade-related legislation. In a statement on the South Lawn of the White House the following morning, the president expressed disappointment because "we worked velY hard and we're velY close to having the reqUisite number of votes. But early this morning it became clear to me that if the matter were taken to a vote there was a substantial chance that we would not get the votes necessary to pass the bill."61 With that statement, Fast Track was dead for 1997. The nation and Congress remained uncomfortable with the New Economy and unsure that additional trade deals are necessaty. Although the president stated in his 1998 State of the Union Address that he intends to renew his "request for the Fast Track negotiating authority," the fate of those words remains to be seen.
Analysis
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Fast Track's failure has imperiled America's leadership of, and participation in, the New Economy. In 1997, free trade opponents exploited Americans' economic and international insecurities to the detriment of u.s. national interest. These opponents were assisted in their mission by a mischaracterization of trade as a vehicle of loss -loss of jobs, loss of national sovereignty, and loss of pride in American craftsmanship. Free trade opponents believe that the "Made in the u.s.A." label is more important than less expensive imports but this argument misses the substantial gains of increased trade, including increased exports, higher paying jobs, and an improved standard of living. America's domestic market is already accessible to foreign products. Only through strong, negotiated trade agreements can the United States reduce foreign barriers to its own goods. Laborers, Wall Street traders, farmers, and profeSSionals all stand to gain from liberalized trade yet this point remains widely unknown and unacknowledged by the American public. If Fast Track supporters expect victory, they cannot allow free trade opponents to control the debate as in 1997.
Arguments in favor of Fast Track and the New Economy did not appeal to many undecided members of Congress and the public. Protectionist members, who would have been an unruly minority ten years ago, have rapidly become mainstream. These members used their constitutional power and prerogative to "check" the administration's trade policy goals. Since the disastrous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the legislative and executive branches have struggled to maintain a workable balance on trade matters but over the past 30 years Congress has continuously enhanced both its oversight and its prescriptive role in trade negotiations. This trend toward substantial congressional involvement in trade matters provided the mechanism for Fast Track's failure.
In the past, trade matters were "just one part of a largely bipartisan foreign policy that rested on support from American political elites. This strategy is no longer effective. "62 Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, U.S. political and military power offered nations assurance against Soviet aggression and members of Congress acknowledged the need for U.S. involvement abroad. With the threat of communism virtually eliminated and the resulting decrease in militaty spending, economic leverage has become increaSingly important as a tool in influencing foreign nations. Many influential legislators no longer believe that economic interdependence benefits the United States and serves international stability, so any move toward economic globalization will be met with fierce resistance. 63 Today, domestic concerns and political constituencies greatly influence congressional direction, motives, and rhetoric. The effect of labor interests on Democratic members cannot be underestimated. Labor unions, which assist Democratic members with fundraising and campaigning, deserted the party following the vote to support NAFTA in 1993, and 40 years of Democratic hegemony in the House of Representatives came to an end. In 1997, organized labor's increased power proved vital in dissuading the vast majority of Democrats from supporting Fast Track for a Democratic president. 64 Despite advocating the admirable goals of labor rights and environmental quality, many Democrats were forced into opposing Fast Track by the uncloaked threats of big labor. The rivalry between President Clinton's heir apparent, Vice President Gore, and I-louse Democratic Leader Gephardt increased the dimensions of this dispute over Fast Track renewal as Gephardt allied himself closely with labor's demands. To curtail this opposition, the president should have moved quickly to introduce and push Fast Track through Congress while labor savored the result of its efforts in the 1996 election atld Clinton's coattails still held some sway with vacillating members. By entering the process too late, the president created a situation where valuable time was lost which opponents used to achieve the necessary level of resistance to Fast Track.
For Fast Track to succeed, business leaders, the president, and other supporters of free trade must better educate the public about the beneHts of decreased trade barriers including our strong economy, the role of expanded trade in building that strength, and the advantageous position of this countlY to make use of the enormous opportunities presented by a growing global economy. Whereas organized labor is able to easily exploit jobs lost to foreign trading partners, business has not adequately argued that increased exports .lead to more and better jobs in the U.S. for Americans. Presidential leadership in this area must be heightened, for despite the fact that "Clinton has preSided over remarkable prosperity and economic growth, with international trade playing a major role ... he failed to link the two in the public mind."65
The lesson from the debate over Fast Track in 1997 is clear: without public support, future trade accords will be subjected to opposition from fi-ee trade adversaries. The president must work closely with the congressionalleadership, free trade advocates, and business leaders to effectively make the connection between international trade, job growth, and the New Economy. State and community leaders, foundation heads, academics, and others must engage in this national effort to show the American people that traditional protectionism is bankrupt and that agreements which lower bar- riers to trade will benefit the country and its financial well-being through better jobs, less expensive goods, and an improved economy. Otherwise, future attempts to secure passage of trade agreements will be met with equally fierce and successful opposition, leading to an "era of diminished expectations" where the New Economy is concerned. 66 14 The two-house disapproval procedure was applicable to decisions on import relief actions when they differed ti'om the recommendations of the u.s. International
Trade Commission. The one-house disapproval procedure was applicable to decisions on countervailing duties, bilateral agreements with Communist countries entered into before enactment of the law, and all annual reviews of most-favoreclnation (MFN) status. ("Almanac of the 2nd Session of the 93rd Congress," Congressional Quarter(v, 1974, 544.) 15 The primary legal issue surrounding the legislative veto is its relationship to the Constitution, which states in Article I that Congress acts bicamerally and presents bills to the president for signature or veto. In other words, the Constitution gives the president, not Congress, the power to veto. 
